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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.~PACl-lE TANK LINES, INC., 
CO\YROY OIL COMPANY, 
OR\'1LL1~ R. STEYENS, 
Adrninistrntm of 0. H. Guyman 
~;state, CH.YSTAL B. GUYMAN 
arnl P Al~L \V. COOK, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
H~~ALL PIPE AND TANK 
COHPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10724 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case in its present posture is a suit for property 
damagP, wherein the defendant contends that the courts 
of the f-ltate of Utah have no personal jurisdiction over it. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'11hP Seventh District Court in and for Carbon Coun-
l.1·, l IPnry Ruggeri, .Judge, granted defendant's Motion to 
<~iu1slt tltt> purported service of Summons upon it. 
I (lW_ 
R1~Lll~F' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
ltt>sJHmclPnt sc'eks an affirmance of the judgment be-
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this brief, \Ve sometirnes refer to the partit>s af' llii·:, 
appeared in the court below. We have no particular 
quarrel with the statement of facts set forth in A]JlH·I 
lants' Brief. However, we believe that it rnay be helvful 
to the court to set forth chronologically the facts which 
we believe to be essential to a determination of the issm· 
before the court. They are as follows: 
1. Defendant regularly qualified to do business in 
the State of Utah on or about May 3, 1961. (R. 13) 
2. From about May 3, 1961, to October 1963, de-
fendant maintained a salaried employee in the State of 
Utah, and was actually engaged in business in the State 
of Utah. In October 1963, said employee was withdrawn 
from the State of Utah, and since that date "defendant 
has not had any employee residing in the State of Utah; 
has not maintained an office in the State of Utah; ha' 
not had a telephone listing in the State of Utah; has not 
had a licensed dealer in the State of Utah; has not had 
anv franchised salesmen in the State of Utah; has had 
no commission agents in the State of Utah; has not 
maintained a bank account in the State of Utah; has n(Jt 
advertised in any Utah publications; and has not con-
ducted any business whatsoever in the State of Utah.'' 
(R. 13-14) 
3. Defendant's certificate of authority to do busi-
ness in the State of Utah was revoked by the Secretary 
of State of Utah, pursuant to Section 16-10-117, PCA 
1953, on February 28, 19fi+. (R.13, 56-57) 
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+. I 'lain tiff Apache Tank Lines, Inc., an Idaho cor-
poration, purchased a tank trailer from defendant out-
1:lidP tl1P State of Utah on or about April 2±, 196+. (R. 1-2, 
l+) 
:'i. On :N ovemher 1±, 19ti±, said trailer was involved 
1n an accident which occurred in Price, Utah, allegedly 
ii.-: a n»:,;ult of a <lef ect in 8aid trailer, causing property 
(larnagL~ to the plaintiffs. (R. 2) 
!i. Plaintiffs initiated the present action by filing 
a Comvlaint in the District Court of Carbon 1Cou11.ty, on 
DPcemher 31, 1965. (R. 6). The Secretary of State of 
L- tah, as purported agent of defendant, was served on or 
about February 16, 1966. (R. 9) 
I. St~1·vice of proeess was attacked by a Motion to 
(~uash filed March 15, 1966, (R. 10) and argued to the 
1·onrt 11ay 3, 1966. Following oral argument, the court 
look tlw matter under advisement, and both sides sub-
111ittPd two written memoranda in support of their re-
copective iiositions. These memoranda have been included 
in tlw reeord on appeal and may be found at pages R. 
Hi-22; 2-1:-30; 31-36; and 38-41. 
( )n .J nly 22, 1966, Judge Ruggeri handed down a 
1·arPfull~· considered memorandum decision, wherein he 
a11alyzc'd the positions of both parties, and then granted 
defondant's Motion to Quash and ordered the purported 
:-;1·rvi<'P of :·rnnunons quashed. This decision was desig-
11<tl('d li~· respondent to be included in the record on ap-
J t1·a l. l H. ;)5) The decision was belatedly attached to the 
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record, but has not bet>n numbered as a part thPn·of. \\'r 
quote from the decision at p. 7, lines 3-13 as follow~: 
''The court finds that the defondant had Jon" 
ceased to do business in the State of l 'tali at th~· 
times complained of by the plaintiffs; that th1· 
defendant was not present in the State of 1itah 
at the time the purported serviee of summons ,rn, 
made upon it; that the defendant was not do in~ 
business in the State of Utah at the times corn 
plained of by the plaintiffs; that the caus1, of 
action, if any, did not accrue during an~' ti1111· 
that the defendant was doing business in the tltatr· 
of Utah, and that the defendant was not doing 
business in the State of Utah when process wa~ 
served upon the Secretary of State." 
The court's decision was subsequently embodied in 
a formal order. (R. 47) 
ARGUMENT 
The narrow legal issue presented to the court by this 
case is whether a foreign corporation whose certificate 
of autl10rit~, to do business in the State of Utah has been 
revoked pursuant to Section 16-10-117 remains subject 
to the ;jurisdiction of the Utah courts for claimed liabil-
ities arising out of transactions occurring after the dafr 
of revocation and outside of the State of Utah, or ·whether 
said corporation remains subject to the jurisdiction of 
tht> Utah <.'.omts until such time as it makes a voluntan· 
withdrawel pursuant to the provisions of Section Hi-llJ-
115. Plaintiffs contend that defendant, having once 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, remains 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, even 
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\li1J11glt ib C('.l'tificate of authority has been revoked, and 
l'Vl'll though it completely withdraws and ceases from all 
c.orporatt~ aetivity in the State, until such time as it 
('ompliPs with the procedural requirements of Section 
lii-10-113. 1t is defendant's position that revocation of 
its c<~rtificate of authority under the provisions of Sec-
tion 1 ()-10-117 accomplishes exactly the same result as 
\rnuld a voluntary withdrawal under Section 16-10-115. 
To put the matter bluntly, it makes little difference 
\\h<·thcr a person is deported by the state or leaves vol-
untarily, he is, in either event, equally absent. 
\Y P sPe no basis for the distinction attempted to be 
drawn by the plaintiffs. The Corporation Act provides 
two methods for termination of the right of a foreign 
<·nrporation to do business in the State of Utah. One is 
by a voluntary withdrawal under the provisions of Sec-
tion 16-10-115. The consequences of a voluntary with-
drawal are set forth in the last sentence of Section 
1 G-10-llG, as follows: "Upon the issuance of such certifi-
c-ate of withdrawal, the authority of the corporation to 
hansaet business in this state shall cease.'' A second pro-
<'<•<lun• is provided by revocation of authority by the 
;-.i<'l'rdary of State under the terms of Section 16-10-117. 
'l'h1~ c01u-wquences of this action are set forth in the last 
s(·ntt-ucp of Section 16-10-118 in language essentially 
1<lPntical to that of Section 116, as follows: "Upon the 
issuaneP of sueh certificate of revocation, the authority 
ul' tlt\' corporation to transact business in this state shall 
1'1.'aSl'.'' 
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While we do not contend that a corporation whose 
certificate has been revoked by the Secretary of Stat~ 
for any of the reasons set forth in Section lG-10-lli 
should be in an advantaged position over a foreign cor-
poration which has withdrawn under Section 16-10-115 
I 
we can see no reason why it should be in c. disadvantaged 
position either. The consequences as spelled out by the 
legislature appear to be the same in either event. 
Plaintiffs place heavy reliance on that portion of 
Section 1'6-10-111, which reads as follows: 
"Whenever a foreign corporation authorized 
to transact business in this state shall fail to 
appoint or maintain a registered agent in this 
state, or whenever any such registered agent 
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the 
registered office, or whenever the certificate of 
authority of a foreign corporation shall be sus-
pended or revoked, then the secretary of state 
shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom 
any such process, notice, or demand may be 
served." 
We do not interpret this to mean that in every situation 
where the certificate of a foreign corporation has been 
~mspended or revoked it remains subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Utah courts by service upon the Secretary of 
State. A more reasonable interpretation is that in those 
situations where it is properly subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts (e.g. as for acts committed during the 
period it was in good standing, or where it may have 
continued unlawfully to do business in the state after 
revocation of its certificate of Authority) it quite prop-
7 
,.rJ.\· ,.;lwuld be subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
(:omts. 1£ven corporations ~which follow the procedure 
of S(•ction 16-10-115 remain subject to the jurisdiction 
of the l"tah courts for two years following their period 
tJf withdrawal for a.ct::; comniitted during their period 
of :;oocl standing. 
We readily eoncede that this defendant would be 
:mbject tu the jurisdiction of the Utah courts for any 
liabillties which it might have incurred during the time 
that it was in good standing in the State of Utah, or at 
auy time ~when it was actually engaged in business in the 
State of Utah, whether properly qualified or not. How-
('Ver, it is undisputed here that it had ceased to do bus-
i1wst-l in the State of Utah before its certificate was re-
voked. 
It it-l for this reason that the holding of this court 
m Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association vs. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 7 Ut. 2d 
:)GG, 32G P. 2d 899, cited and relied upon by appellants, 
is not applicable here. In that case the foreign corpora-
tion had been properly qualified in Utah during the time 
of the transactions out of which the claimed cause of 
action aro:oe. Here the transaction occurred after the time 
of the revocation of authority and cessation of doing 
Lut-;iness within the state. 
'rhe purchase by plaintiff Apache Tank Lines, Inc. 
l'rorn ddendant was made out of the State of Utah and 
afte1· thP time defendant's Certificate of Authority had 
iiP<'n revoked. The accident out of which the claimed 
8 
cause of action arose occurred after the Certificah, ut 
Authority had been revoked. 
It was not the intent or purpose of the above quoted 
provision of Sec. 16-10-111 to make a corporation subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts in perpetuity h) 
reasons of failure to comply with 16-10-115. The with-
drawal is accomplished equally effectually by submitting 
to revocation by the Secretary of State. 
The rule is stated in 23 Arn. Jur. 516, Foreign Cor-
porations, ~500 ,as follows : 
"* * * Jurisdiction cannot he obtained of a 
foreign corporation by service on its designatrd 
agent where the subject matter of the litigation 
is a transaction taking place in another state, 
after the corporation has \Vithdrawn or been ex-
pelled from the state, and has entirely ceased to 
do business therein." 
There is some mention in Appellants' Brief of the 
"minimum contacts" rule, as enunciated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in such cases as International 
Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 US 310. That case, and 
others like it, have to do with situations where the de-
fendant has never qualified to do business within the 
state but J·urisdiction is claimed bv reason of the fact ' . 
that the defendant is actually transacting business within 
the state, or has such "minimum contacts" with the state 
that in fair play and justice it ought to defend in that 
state. Those cases have no application to the facts here. 
nor do they support the contentions of the Appellants. 
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Ln sL·wral cases decided by this court, the defendant 
l1ad unwh greater activity or "contacts" in the State of 
Utah than did the defendant here at the time of the 
transaction in l{Uestion and, yet, was held not to be sub-
jn:t to tlw jurisdiction of the Utah courts. See Parke, 
Dovis and ()o. vs. Fifth Judicial District Court, 93 Utah 
217, 72 P. 2d 46G; Advamce-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc., 
cs. Stohl, 75 Utah 124, 283 P. 731; McGriff vs. Charles 
Antell, /11c., 123 Utah 166, 256 P. 2d 703; Western Gas 
Appliances, Inc., vs. Servel, Inc., 123 Utah 229, 257 P. 2d 
%0; Dykes vs. Reliable Fitrniture & Carpet, 3 Utah 2d 
~-l-!, 277 P. 2d 969; East Coast Discount Corporation vs. 
Heyu11lds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 P. 2d 853; Thorpe Finamce 
Corporution i:s. Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206. 
'L'he::w cast's are discussed in some detail in our memor-
andum of authorities contained in the record at pages 
2.J--30. At the time that memorandum was prepared, 
which \\'as before oral argument on the Motion to Quash, 
11·0 undPrstood that plaintiffs were relying on the "min-
imum contacts" rule. However, in their argument to the 
(:011rt, both below and here, they have relied on their 
vonstruction of the Corporation Code. We have, there-
fute, felt that no useful purpose would be served, by 
ll'Jwating that discussion in this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
\:\Then defendant's Certificate of Authority was re-
voked by the Secretary of State, it, in effect, became a 
1l•ln-1·Psident of the State of Utah, no longer subject to 
tlH· .imisdiction of the Utah courts for acts or transac-
10 
tions occurring after its removal from the state. ~in~" 
that date, it has transacted no business in the 8tate of 
Utah, has not been within the State of Ptah, has had no 
contacts whatsoever in the State of Utah, and is, there-
fore, immune from service in the State of Utah for 
acts occurring after revocation of its Certificate of 
Authority. 
The judgment below should be affinned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & .JENSEN 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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